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I. INTRODUCTION 
On April 28, 1981, the Professional Air Traffic Con¬ 
trollers Organization (a labor union representing Air Traffic 
Controllers) and the Federal Aviation Administration (a federal 
agency responsible for monitoring and promoting civil aviation 
regulations to ensure the safety of air transportation) met to 
negotiate a new contract. In this meeting Robert Poli, the 
national president of the Professional Air Traffic Controllers 
Organization (PATCO), expressed some dissatisfaction with 
regard to long hours of work and salaries.^ A controller is 
required to work forty hours a week but he could be asked to 
work overtime when there is a demand for it. An average air 
traffic controller's salary is $34,000 a year but overtime 
could increase his/her income to approximately $45,000. 
Although the salaries and the long hours of work seem 
to be very reasonable if they are compared to other federal 
government positions, the representatives of PATCO stated that 
because of the nature of the job, tension and pressure are 
placed upon the air traffic controllers and therefore demanded 
a thirty-two hour work schedule each week and a $10,000 
increase in salary. An average U.S. postal worker's salary is 
^Letter to members of the Professional Air Traffic Con¬ 
trollers Organization, from Robert Poli, National President 
(Washington, D.C.: 23 May 1981). 
1 
2 
$35,000 a year, but with overtime, the salary could increase 
to $40,000-$45,000. In addition to the above demands, the 
union made numerous other demands such as expanded retirement 
benefits, improved life insurance programs, improved condi¬ 
tions of employment and an increase in overtime rate (see 
Appendix A for more demands). 
On the other hand, the Federal Aviation Administration 
which is bound by the Civil Service Preform Act of 1978, rejected 
the proposal made by PATCO and responded with a counter pro¬ 
posal. (See Appendix B.) Specifically, the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) rejected the proposed increase in salary 
and the reduction in work hours per week, but its counter pro¬ 
posal responded favorably to the demands involving conditions 
of employment, such as "personnel policies, practices, and 
2 
other matters affecting the general working conditions." 
With regard to the salary demands, the FAA offered an alter- 
3 
native wage settlement which PATCO refused and went on strike. 
Here in Atlanta, out of a total number of 580 air traffic con¬ 
trollers assigned to the metropolitan area, 366 controllers 
participated in the strike. 
However, four hours after the strike had begun through¬ 
out the country, President Reagan ordered the striking 
O 
Robert D. Lee, Public Personnel System (Baltimore: 
University Park Press, 1979), p. 380. 
3 
"Both Sides Make Mistakes in the Controllers' Strike," 
Wall Street Journal, 15 September 1981, p. 28. 
3 
controllers to return to duty or face the possibility of 
being, terminated.^ Also, the President gave them a forty-eight 
hour grace period to return to work beginning with their report¬ 
ing time of duty. The President's order was refused and as a 
result it brought about numerous adverse effects on the air 
traffic system.^ 
Outline of the Study 
Section II describes the problem and its setting, and 
discusses the effects of the strike in Metropolitan Atlanta. 
Section III examines the literature applicable to strikes in 
the public sector. Section IV presents the research design 
for the quantitative analysis to measure the impacts of the 
strike. Section V presents the results of an analysis of the 
impact of the strike at Hartsfield International Airport. 
Finally, Section VI gives a summary of the research and recom¬ 
mendations for further study. 
^Interview with William H. Wynn, FAA Chief, Sepcial 
Programs/Recruitment Staff, 18 January 1982. 
^"Both Sides Made Mistakes in the Controllers' Strike," 
Wall Street Journal, 15 September 1981, p. 28. 
^For discussion of the effects see pages 7-11. 
II. THE PROBLEM AND ITS SETTING 
The FAA as indicated earlier, is an institution respon¬ 
sible for monitoring and promoting civil aviation regulations 
to ensure safety of air transportation. The agency has three 
administrative levels of organization. The three administra¬ 
tive levels are: 1) the Headquarters, 2) the Regional Office, 
and 3) the facilities or detached units. The FAA Headquarters 
is located in Washington, D.C. with its administrator who is 
responsible for the agency's planning, directing, controlling 
and evaluating air traffic system. The regional offices are 
located in different parts of the country, namely the Great 
Lakes, Eastern, Southern, Alaskan, New England, Southwest, 
Northwest Mountain, Central and Western Pacific offices. In the 
Southern Region, the head office is located in Atlanta, Georgia. 
The Regional office carries out assigned responsibilities 
within agency's policies, program plans, guidelines, standards, 
and procedures. The facilities or detached units are subsidiary 
units of the regional office which administers different pro¬ 
grams of the agency within the geographic area in the region. 
In metropolitan Atlanta, these facilities are located in seve¬ 
ral areas. For example, the Atlanta Air Route Traffic Control 
Center (En Route Center) is located in Hampton; Atlanta Tower 
(Tower) is located at Hartsfield International Airport; 
4 
5 
Peachtree-DeKalb Airport (Tower) is located in DeKalb County; 
and Fulton County Airport (Tower) and Charlie Brown Airport 
(Flight Service Station) are located in Fulton County. All of 
the above subsidiary units have distinct functions. For in¬ 
stance, the Atlanta Tower coordinates aircraft departure and 
arrival within a three to thirty mile radius. On the other 
hand, the Atlanta Air Route Traffic Control Center separates 
aircraft along established air routes across the country 
between Tower jurisdictions, while the Charlie Brown Airport 
gives weather briefing to pilots. 
At any given time, a controller may be assigned to one 
of the following functional areas: 1) the En Route Center, 2) 
the Flight Service Station, or 3) the Tower. An air traffic 
controller who is assigned to work at the En Route Center is 
responsible for maintaining a check on aircrafts, issuing 
instructions, approving clearance, as well as initiating search 
and rescue operations to locate overdue aircraft. On the other 
hand, a controller who is assigned to the Flight Service Sta¬ 
tion provides assistance to pilots who need information on the 
station's area, including terrain, weather peculiarities, pre¬ 
flight and inflight information, and provides any other impor¬ 
tant information pertinent to the safety of a flight, while a 
controller in charge of the Tower controls traffic within a 
thirty-three mile radius under Visual Flight Rule (VFR). The 
Tower controller may work either in the glass wall room at the 
6 
top of the tower or in the radar room below it. 
Internship Experience 
As an intern in the Labor Relations Division of the FAA 
in Atlanta, Georgia, the writer served as a Personnai Adminis¬ 
trative Student Trainee. The internship assignments were de¬ 
signed to enable the writer to understand several important 
concepts in the Labor Relations Division. For example, assign¬ 
ments such as processing of grievances, appeals, and the air 
traffic controllers' strike projects were given to the writer 
to provide judgemental and analytical training in Labor Rela- 
tions. These duties of the Personnel Administrative Trainee 
afforded the intern the opportunity to review and analyze prob¬ 
lems which resulted from PATCO actions. 
In reviewing and analyzing the problems, the intern 
realized that PATCO strongly believed that the air traffic 
system would not continue to function effective and efficiently 
without their services. The organization felt that the strike 
would force the FAA to negotiate immediately, and to meet the 
demands made by PATCO. However, the FAA did not acquiesce 
because to satisfy some of the demands would require an enact¬ 
ment of new legislation by the United States Congress. As a 
result of this, and failure to negotiate a settlement, the 
strike imposed many adverse affects on the FAA, the airline 
industry, the striking air traffic controllers, the general 
^U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation 
Administraiton Pamphlet. 
7 
public and the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organiza¬ 
tion. 
The Effects of the Air Traffic Controllers' 
Strike in Metropolitan Atlanta 
The air traffic controllers' strike had a tremendous 
8 impact on the operation of the air traffic service. For 
example, there was a reduction in the number of flights, and 
an increase in the working hours of the FAA employees at the 
facilities. In order to overcome the effects of the strike 
and to maintain a high standard of safety, the FAA requested 
and received military controllers from the Air Force and as¬ 
signed them to the Atlanta Tower and Atlanta En Route Traffic 
Control Center. Although these military controllers had re¬ 
ceived sufficient training, they were given civil aviation 
instructions by FAA in order to enable them to carry out the 
9 
general functions of the air traffic controllers. 
Because of the complexity of the air traffic in metro¬ 
politan Atlanta, the military controllers did not fill all the 
vacancies, hence, recent retirees were recruited or were 
asked to return to duty. Most of the recent retirees were 
paid exorbitantly more than the regular controllers at the 
beginning of the strike. The high salary was an incentive for 
the retirees to return to work. Furthermore, the FAA had 
8 
Interview with William H. Wynn, FAA Chief of Special 
Programs/Recruitment Staff, Atlanta, Georgia, 18 January 1982. 
^Ibid. 
8 
to bring in some air traffic controllers who were not on 
strike from smaller facilities or airports to assist in 
10 
Metropolitan Atlanta Area. Of course, this had an effect 
on the smaller airports because some of them were forced to 
close indefinitely and many passengers were inconvenienced as 
a result of closing the smaller facilities. The airports in 
metropolitan Atlanta before the strike generated a large 
percentage of their revenue from landing fees, but much was 
loslr because there was a reduction in the number of flights 
11 
landing. 
The Federal Labor Relations Authority found that 
"PATCO willfully and intentionally violated Title V of the 
United States Code of the Federal Service Labor-Management 
Relations Statute by calling, participating in, and condoning 
•rip 
a strike at the FAA facilities. Because of the violation 
of Title V, the Federal Labor Relations Authority revoked 
PATCO's status as exclusive bargaining agent for approximately 
18,000 air traffic controllers.13 Also, some of the leaders 
of PATCO were penalized and fined by several federal judges.^ 
10Ibid. 
lllnterview with John Bradon, FAA, Director of Public 
Information, 20 July 1982. 
l^U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Labor Re¬ 
lations Authority, Washington, D.C.s November 1981, p. Jk. 
13 
U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Labor Re¬ 
lations Authority, News Release, Washington, D.C.s October 1981, 
^"U.S. Air Laid-0ff Employees", Newsweek, August 1981, 
pp.52-53. 
9 
Robert Poli, the National President and leader of PATCO, was 
penalized, fined and simutaneously lost his right to represent 
the air traffic controllers. 
The controllers who were engaged in the strike and 
failed to report to duty as ordered by President Reagan were 
taken off the employment roll by FAA. This resulted in a 
severe hardship on many of the members of PATCO. For example, 
many controllers lost their valuable possessions, such as 
cars and homes because they were unable to make the payments 
The public was affected by the strike in that many 
flight schedules were cancelled. This forced many passengers 
to use alternative modes of transportation, such as buses, 
16 
automobiles, and trains. Passengers traveling long dis¬ 
tances were delayed because there were fewer direct and/or 
17 connecting flights to come locations. 
As a result of the strike, the business community was 
affected. The employees who traveled frequently to represent 
some of the major banks cancelled or postponed many appoint- 
1 8 ments which were scheduled. These employees made the 
necessary adjustments according to flights that were avail¬ 
able. Some of the employees of the First National Bank were 
^Interview with William H. Wynn, FAA Chief, Special 




Interview with Dixie Weaver, First National Bank, 
Atlanta, Georgia, 9 June 1982. 
10 
forced to drive to make some of their scheduled appointments.19 
Similarly, the Federal Reserve Bank employees who traveled 
frequently were forced to make adjustments in their travel 
schedules to make their appointments and reschedule their 
appointments around the availability of the flights.2^ 
Finally, the air traffic controller's strike has had 
different impacts on major airlines. For example, American 
Airlines was forced to cancel more than 3i500 flights per day 
and gave a leave of absence to 1,650 employees.21 U.S. Air 
laid off some of its employees and reduced their executives' 
pay by 15 percent to cover financial losses incurred. Delta 
Airlines reduced its staff by authorizing employees to go on 
vacation.^3 American Express Travel Agency was forced to can- 
pit 
cel and reschedule some flights of travelers. Other air¬ 
lines, such as Eastern, were affected adversely also. 
The strike imposed serious limitations upon the National 
Air Transportation System, and the FAA's inability to safely 
control air traffic at the existing volume forced the agency 
to reduce the level of service to the users. 
*9 ibid. 
20 
Interview with Dwaine Cline, Public Relations Officer, 
Federal Reserve Bank, Atlanta, Georgia, 9 June 1982. 




22+ Interview with Senior Examiner, Shirley Parker, 
American Exnress, Atlanta, Georgia, 9 June 1982. 
III. RELEVANT LITERATURE 
Prior to World War II, the U.S. Government played a 
minor role in the economy and society as a whole. But, after 
World War II the public sector began increasing its role be¬ 
cause there was an increase in population and persistent 
poverty. Furthermore, demands for new and increased services, 
coupled v/ith a revolution in traditional production indus¬ 
tries caused by cybernetics, contributed to the shift from 
25 the blue collar employment to white collar jobs. According 
to Lutrin and Settle, "the growth of a large public enter¬ 
prise reflects the public's changing attitude about the ap¬ 
propriate role of government in our economy" For example, 
during the early days of the Republic, 
...government played a relatively minor role in the 
economy and society as a whole; in the 1800s, the U.S. 
citizenry required fewer than .5 federal bureaucrats 
per 1,000 inhabitants, however, on the eve of World 
War II the figure rose to .7 per 1,000 inhabitants and 
"by 1975 it had climbed to 14.8 per 1,000 inhabitants 
(excluding military personnel).^7 
The reasons for this phenomenal growth is attributed to the 
? 5 •'The Emergence of Public Sector Collective Bargaining", 
Monthly Labor Review, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Office of Per¬ 
sonnel Management, 1981), p. 6. 
2 6 
Carl Lutrin and Alan Settle, American Public Admini¬ 
stration Concepts and Cases, (Palo Alto, Calif.: Mayfield 




"public's mounting demand for goods and services that only 
28 
the government could provide". 
Likewise, union membership and activity among govern¬ 
ment employees can be traced to the early days of the Republic. 
Employees of Naval Shipyards and Army Arsenals organized into 
unions during the early part of the 19th century. The first 
recorded evidence of a government work stoppage occurred in 
1835 when employees at the Washington, D.C. and Philadelphia 
Navy yards struck for the ten-hour day and for redress of 
their grievances.9 The organization of these workers and 
other public employees during; this period was localized among 
craft employees in building metal, printing, and maritime 
trades.-^ There were no national unions during this period. 
With the growth of government employment, and an in¬ 
crease in the number of unions, it was not long before govern- 
ment employees formed their own unions. But union effective¬ 
ness was hampered by government legislation. Several legis¬ 
lations were passed to govern public employees and their par¬ 
ticipation in unions. Prior to 1912, federal employees were 
bound by a series of "gag rules" which prohibited them, either 
individually or collectively through their organization, from 




"The Emergence of Public Sector Collective Bargaining", 
Monthly Labor Review. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Office of Per- • 




31 related matters. According to Lutrin and Settle, "The first 
major policy favoring public employee associations was the 1912 
32 Lloyd-Lafollette Act", which allowed postal employees the 
right to form and join labor organizations in order to peti¬ 
tion or lobby Congress for the redress of their grievances, 
33 
and to furnish information to members or Congress. Although 
the Lloyd-Lafollette Act gave Federal employees the right 
to organize, it denied them the right to bargain collective¬ 
ly. In 1935* the National Relations Act, also known as the 
Wagner Act specifically exempted public employees from hav¬ 
ing industrial-type labor unions and engaging the collective 
o / 
bargaining. The Taft-Harley Act (Labor Management Relations 
Act of 19^7) used the Wagner Act of 1935 in that it sought to 
35 
equalize the power of employees and labor unions. Since 1912 
there were "numerous efforts to re-orient the federal govern¬ 
ment's position in Labor-Management relations, but no major 
change occurred until 1962 when President Kennedy issued 
31 
Ray Marshall and Brain Rugleg, Role of Unions in the 
American Economy, (New York: Joint Council on Education, 1976), 
p. 78. 
32 
Carl Lutrin and Alan Settle, American Public Admini¬ 
stration Concents and Cases, (Palo Alto: Mayfield Publishing 
Co., 1976), p. 3. 
33 
'Ray Marshall and Brian Rugleg, Role of Unions in the A- 
merican Economy, (New York: Joint Council on Education, 1976), 
p. 78. 
34 
Carl Lutrin and Alan Settle, American Public Admini¬ 
stration Concents and Cases, (Palo Alto: Mayfield Publishing 




Executive Order 10988. 
President Kennedy's Executive Order enabled Federal 
employees to gain the right to organize and engage in collec¬ 
tive bargaining. This process, called collective bargaining, 
is the procedure by which labor and management meet for the 
purpose of discussing wages, hours of work, conditions of 
37 
employment, and other relevant employment matters. This col¬ 
lectivity involves mutual concerns and considerations. In other 
words, the union representatives involved in the collective 
bargaining process must be concerned with the rights and respon¬ 
sibilities of the agency or management. Also, management must 
be concerned with the needs of labor. 
Executive Order 10988 provided a three-level union 
recognition plan: informal, formal, and exclusive, based on the 
38 representative strength of the union. For the first few years 
of following the issuance of that Executive Order, federal unions 
grew preponderantly among postal workers, who had been well 
O Q 
organized even before Executive Order 10988 was issued. Not 
3 6 
Robert D. Lee, Public Personnel System (Baltimore: 
University Park Press, 1979), p. 367. 
37s. T. Williamson and Herbert Harris, Trends in Col- 
lective Bargaining (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1945), 
p. 484. 
38"The Emergence of Public Sector Collective Bargaining," 
Monthly Labor Review (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Office of Personnel 
Management, 1981), p. 6. 
39 "The Emergence of Public Sector Collective Bargaining," 
Monthly Labor Review (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Office of Personnel 
Management, 1981), p. 6. 
15 
only did the Kennedy Order stimulate unionism among federal 
employees it also had a "spillover” effect in legitimizing 
unionism at the state and local levels. The American Federa¬ 
tion of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), founded 
in 1937, hovered at the 100,000 mark in membership for several 
40 
decades. However, by 1967, AFSCME had 350,000 members and was 
growing at a rate of 1,000 new members per week.4"'" Since Execu¬ 
tive Order 10988, there have been three executive orders clarify¬ 
ing and formalizing the bargaining process for federal employees. 
Executive order 11491 which was issued in 1969, provided a new 
framework for the conduct of collective bargaining in the federal 
service, and the Federal Labor Relations Council was established 
to make policy and to supervise the operation of federal collec- 
42 
tive bargaining. However, it was evolutionary in nature, pre¬ 
serving the continuity of the system of relationships which had 
/ 7 
developed between unions and federal agencies. Executive 
Order 11616 (1971) included three requirements : (1) negotiated 
agreements should contain a negotiated grievance procedures; (2) 
any issue raised as an unfair labor practice could not be taken 
through the negotiated grievance procedure; (3) issues which are 





^Office of Personnel Management, Important Events 
Relating to Federal Labor Relations (Washington, D.C.: Labor 
Relations Training Center, 1979), p. 9. 
43Ibid. 
16 
through the unfair labor practice procedure. Executive Order 
11838 (1975) gave major attention to the scope of negotiations. 
In 1978, with intensive Congressional lobbying by 
federal unions and with the endorsement of President Jimmy 
Carter, Executive Order 11491 as amended was superseded by 
Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act. According to Title 
VII; 
The collective negotiation process established by 
statute was seen as providing permanent rights to 
workers, whereas under the previous system a president 
could alter the collective bargaining process by 
issuing a new Executive Order.44 
The Federal Labor Authority was patterned after the 
National Labor Relations Board, and it replaced the Federal 
Labor Relations Council and the Assistant Secretary of Labor 
for Labor-Management Relations.^ 
Postal Strike of 1970 
In 1970, President Nixon's Budget Message "specified 
that salary increases of postal employees would be deferred 
six months later.The National Letter Carriers Association 
became dissatisfied with the delay and staged a strike against 
the Postal Service. As a result of this action postal and 
general schedule employees received a six percent increase 
44 
Robert D. Lee, Public Personnel Systems 





"Text of President's Message to Congress on Federal 
Budget for Fiscal Year 1971," New York Times, 3 February 1970, 
p. 25. 
17 
retroactive December 1969, and the Postal Reform Act was passed 
which provided that pay, health and welfare benefits, and leave 
are to be determined by collective bargaining.^ 
Memphis Firemen Strike of 1978 
Some of the most active public sector union in the 
nation can be found at the local level. For example, the Ameri¬ 
can Federation of Teachers, American Federation of State, County 
and Municipal Employees, and the International Association of 
Firefighters are active unions at the local level. 
In July of 1988, Local 1784 of the International Associa- 
ciation of Firefighters initiated a strike against the Fire 
Department of Memphis, Tennessee, because of dissatisfaction with 
48 
pay. During the strike, 205 fires were allegedly set by 
49 
arsonists. Memphis officials, including the police established 
a crew (i.e., a body of people) to patrol the streets, Tennessee 
National Guardsmen, State Forestry Service, Marine and Navy Fire¬ 
men were called upon to aasist the nonstriking firefighters."^ 
However, the striking firefighters did not return to work until 
47 
Office of Personnel Management, Important Events 
Relating to Federal Labor Relations (Washington, D.C.: Labor 
Relations Training Center, 1979), p. 8. 
48 
"Memphis Firemen Strike in Dispute Over Contract," 
New York Times, 2 July 1978, p. 17. 
49"Memphis Firemen's Strike Brings Fires and Curfews," 








The research techniques used to measure the impact of 
the 1981 air traffic controllers' strike were a structured ques¬ 
tionnaire, personal interviews, and a review of relevent litera¬ 
ture on strikes in the public sector. Because the air traffic 
controllers' strike is recent, very little study has been done 
on its impact and, therefore, this study is based mainly on 
interviews, government documents, newspaper and magazine articles. 
The Federal Aviation officials, the airline industry officials, 
and some of the members of the business community were inter¬ 
viewed . 
The questionnaire was developed to convey the general 
public opinion of the 1981 air traffic controllers strike in 
metropolitan Atlanta. The questionnaire included queries on the 
effects of the air traffic controllers' strike as it related to 
the FAA, the airline industry, the general public and the Profes¬ 
sional Air Traffic Controllers Organization. 
The questionnaire was administered to a random sample 
of passengers at the Hartsfield International Airport. The 
researcher administered the questionnaire to this particular 
population because they used the airline facilities for traveling 
purposes and, it was assumed that they would be more familiar 
with the effects of the air traffic controllers' strike than the 
19 
20 
general public was. The questionnaire was administered to an 
equal number of male and female passengers because the researcher 
was interested in comparing each response by sex. A contingency 
table analysis was utilized to determine a possible significant 
difference in the responses to each question by sex. This con¬ 
tingency table presented the frequency distribution of each ques¬ 
tion. The frequency distribution consisted of a raw count of each 
question and the percentage of each question based on the total 
number of respondents. To evaluate the statistical significance 
of a difference between Group 1 (males) and Group 2 (females), 
the researcher used a statistical procedure known as the t-test. 
After completing the frequency distribution, the researcher 
used the t-test to compare the measurements for Group 1 with 
those of Group 2 to see if the groups responses were different 
on each question. 
The researcher computed a statistic referred to as a 
student t. The value of t itself was not important; any value 
could be used to determine the probability associated with 
the observed difference of the mean of each question. 
Let us consider the results printed in Appendix D. 
Male respondents (Group 1) are being compared with female respon¬ 
dents (Group 2). The left hand portion of the table indicates 
the number of respondents, the means, the standard deviation, 
and the standard error on the given question answered by each 
group. In the center, the reader will find printed an F value 
and its associated probability. 
To understand the data supplied in the appendix, one 
21 
must have an explanation of the F value. The traditional 
t-test assumes that the two groups are drawn from a population 
which sample variance on each question being studied. Because 
of the chance differences in each group being studied, the re¬ 
searcher is not likely to find exactly equal group variances, 
even if the population variances are equal. The researcher 
could test the assumption that the group responses on each 
question were sufficiently similar. This is where the F-value 
comes in. If the t value is not significant (if the associated 
probability is larger than cutoff value, such as 1.5), then 
The researcher may use the regular t-test formula. The formula 
averages the Group's variances to obtain a "Pool Variance Esti¬ 
mate." If the F value is significant (that is, if the associated 
probability is smaller than the cutoff value 1.5), then the 
researcher can assume that the differences in the sample variance 
reflect real differences in tht corresponding population. 
On the right side of Appendix D, there is one portion 
labeled "Pooled Variance Estimate," and another labeled "Separate 
Variance." The researcher used the pool variance to test the 
statistical significance after computing the probability of the 
F value with the t value for each question. 
The researcher obtained results indicating that the 
responses to questions 3, 10, 17, and 20 are significantly dif¬ 
ferent because their t value is greater than 1.5. 
After examining the frequency distribution and the t- 
test of each question, the researcher was interested in 
22 
investigaitng the relationship of question one to the remaining 
questions. The statistical procedure used was the cross tabu¬ 
lation. The results indicated that the responses to each ques¬ 
tion were very similar to the responses in the frequency dis¬ 
tribution and the t-test, but there was a major difference in 
the male and female responses of question one crossed by 17. 
V. THE ANALYSIS 
The questionnaire was administered to a random sample 
of 144 passengers at the Hartsfield International Airport. One 
hundred and two passengers responded, a number which reflected 
a response rate of 70.8 percent. Table 1 represents the fre¬ 
quency distribution of the respondents by sex: male 50 (49 

















50 49 49 49 
Female 
Total 
52 51 51 
102 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases - 102; Missing cases - 0. 
100.00 
The importance of this is to evaluate the statistical 
significance between Group 1 (male) and Group 2 (female), and 
therefore, they are treated first. A T-test is used (see 
Appendix D). Speicifically, for this study, the pool variance 
estimate column is used. According to the procedure, if the 
t-value is below 1.5 it means that there is no difference in the 
response by sex. If the t-value is above 1.5 there is a 
23 
The t-test compared the response of 52 significant difference. 
Group 1 (males) with that of Group 2 (females). This computation 
indicated that the responses to questions 3, 10, 17 and 20 have 
statistical significance because the t-value is greater than 1.5. 
A close analysis of these responses demonstrate the differences 
in the responses of each question by sex. 
Table 2 illustrates frequency distribuiton of question 
3 by sex. Question 3 asked the respondents whether they felt 
that the air traffic controllers in metropolitan Atlanta acted 
properly by participating in a strike. The results indicated 
that 34 percent of the male group felt that the air traffic con¬ 
trollers in this area acted properly by participating in the 
strike. In contrast to this line of thoiight, 48 percent of the 
male respondents felt that the controllers did not act properly 
by participating in the strike, and 18 percent of the males were 
uncertain. On the other hand, 62 percent of the female group felt 
that the controllers acted properly by participating in a strike; 
29 percent of this female group felt that the controllers did not 
act properly by participating in the strike, and 9 percent of the 
female respondents were uncertain. In general, the result shows 
that a majority of the female respondents felt that the con¬ 
trollers acted properly by participating in a strike, while the 
male respondents felt that the controllers did not act properly 
by participating in the strike. 
^William Q. Klecka, Norman Hinie and C. Hadlai Hull, 
SPSS Primer (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1975), p. 70. 
25 
TA3LE 2 















Agree 1.000 17 34 34 34 
Disagree 2.000 24 48 48 82 
Don't Know 3.000 9 18 18 100.0 
Total 50 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases - 50; missing cases - 0. 
Female 
Agree 1.000 32 62 62 62 
Disagree 2.000 15 29 29 91 
Don'L Know 3.000 5 9 9 100 
Total 52 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases - 52; missing cases - 0. 
Table 3 illustrates the frequency distribution of Ques¬ 
tion 10 by sex. Question 10 inquired whether respondents felt 
that the striking air traffic controllers should be compensated 
for the loss of income while on strike. Forty percent of the 
female group felt that the controllers should be compensated 
for the loss of income, while 50 percent objected to the idea 
and 10 percent of the female respondents indicated that they 
were uncertain. On the other hand, 72 percent of the male 
respondents felt that the controllers should not be compensated 
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for the loss of income. Only 18 percent of the male respon¬ 
dents believed in such compensation and 10 percent of the male 
group were uncertain. The results indicated that the majority 
of the male respondents were opposed to compensating the strik¬ 
ing controllers for the loss of income while on strike. A much 
larger percentage of the female respondents were also opposed 
to such compensation, but is lesser than that of the male. The 
results of the question could be attributed to the fact that 
women are more sympathetic on this question than men. 
TABLE 3 















Agree 1.000 9 18 18 18 
Disagree 2.000 36 72 72 90 
Don't Know 3.000 5 10 10 100.0 
Total 50 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases - 50; missing cases - 0. 
Female 
Agree 1.000 21 40 40 40 
Disagree 2.000 26 50 50 50 
Don't Know 3.000 5 10 10 100.0 
Total 52 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases - 52; missing cases - 0. 
I! 
Similar to Tables 2 and 3, Table 4 shows the frequency 
distribution of question 17 by sex. In this question the 
respondents were asked whether they felt the public was affected 
as a result of the strike. Seventy-three percent of the female 
group agreed that the public was adversely affected. Twelve 
percent of the female respondents said that they felt the public 
was not affected, and 15 percent of the female respondents were 
uncertain. A larger percent (90 percent) of the male group felt 
that the public was affected, and only 10 percent of this group 
felt that the general public were not affected. The results 
indicated that both male and female respondents felt that the 
TABLE 4 















Agree 1.000 38 73 73 73 
Disagree 2.000 6 12 12 85 
Don't Know 3.000 8 15 15 100.0 
Total 52 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases - 52; missing cases - 0. 
Male 
Agree 1.000 45 90 90 90 
Disagree 2.000 5 10 10 100.0 
Total 50 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases - 50; missing cases - 0. 
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public was adversely affected. The results of the study indi¬ 
cated that the males interviewed traveled more frequently than 
females. Males probably felt the general public was affected 
more because they traveled more frequently than females. 
Similarly, Table 5 portrays the frequency distribution 
of Question 20 by sex. Here the respondents were asked if they 
felt the results of the air traffic controllers strike would 
discourage other unions in the public sector from engaging in 
unlawful strikes. Forty-four percent of the female group's 
TABLE 5 















Agree 1.000 31 62 62 62 
Disagree 2.000 12 24 24 86 
Don't Know 3.000 _7 14 14 100 
Total 50 100 100 
Valid cases - 50; missing cases - 0. 
Female 
Agree 1.000 23 44 44 44 
Disagree 2.000 16 31 31 75 
Don't Know 3.000 13 25 25 100 
Total 100 100 100 
Valid cases - 52; missing cases - 0. 
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respondents believed that the results of the strike would dis¬ 
courage other unions in the public sector from engaging in unlaw¬ 
ful strikes. Thirty-one percent of the female respondents dis¬ 
agreed while 25 percent of them were uncertain. On the other 
hand, 62 percent of the male group felt that the results of the 
air traffic controllers strike would discourage other unions 
from engaging in unlawful strikes. Only 24 percent of the male 
respondents disagreed, and 14 percent were uncertain. A majority 
of the male respondents on this question felt that the results 
of the strike would discourage other unions in the public sector 
from engaging in unlawful strikes. The female respondents were 
closely divided. 
According to the t-value, there were no differences in 
the response by sex in the other questions because the t-value 
was not above 1.5. Therefore, the researcher did not provide a 
breakdown by sex on the following questions: 
In Question 1 the respondents were asked whether they 
felt that President Reagan's position to fire the air traffic 
controllers was justifiable. The results indicated that 50 per¬ 
cent of the respondents agreed with Reagan's position to dismiss 
the controllers. Forty-six percent of the respondents dis¬ 
agreed with Reagan's position and only 4 percent was uncertain. 
A large percentage of the respondents agreed with Reagan’s 
position to terminate the controllers. 
Question 2 polled the opinion about the legitimacy of 
the air traffic controllers'actions. The respondents were 
asked whether they felt that the air traffic controllers were 
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making legitimate demands by requiring higher salaries and 
shorter work hours per week. The results indicated that 38 per¬ 
cent of the respondents felt that the controllers were making 
legitimate demands by demanding higher salaries. Forty-eight 
percent of the respondents disagreed, and 14 percent were uncer¬ 
tain. A large percentage of the respondents did not feel that 
the controllers were making legitimate demands by requiring higher 
salaries and shorter work hours per week. 
Following Question 2, in Question 4, the respondents 
were asked if they felt the controllers should continue to work 
forty hours per week, or they should reduce the work hour load. 
In answer to this question, 54 percent of the respondents felt 
that the controllers should continue to work forty hours per week. 
Thirty-two percent of the respondents felt that the controllers 
should not continue to work forty hours per week and 14 percent 
were uncertain. A large percentage of the respondents felt that 
the controllers should continue to work forty hours per week. 
In the opinion of the respondents this could be translated to 
mean that every public sector employee should work forty hours 
per week regardless of the nature of the job he/she performs. 
Similar to Question 4, in Question 5, the respondents were asked 
whether they felt that reducing the controllers work hours from 
forty to thirty-two per week would alleviate stress. Forty-eight 
percent of the respondents felt that a reduction in work hours 
would not alleviate their stress problems, while 32 percent of 
respondents agreed. Twenty percent of the respondents were 
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uncertain. The results indicated that the respondents did not 
feel that a reduction of hours per week would alleviate the 
level of stress. 
In Question 6 the respondents were asked whether they 
felt that the present work schedule would cause the air traffic 
controllers to become mentally disturbed. Twenty-eight percent 
of the respondents felt that the present schedule would cause 
the controller to have some mental problems. Firty-one percent 
of the respondents did not feel that the present schedule would 
cause the controllers to have mental problems, and 21 percent 
was uncertain. The results indicated that the respondents felt 
that the present work schedule does not cause the controllers to 
become mentally disturbed. 
In Question 7, the respondents were asked whether they 
felt the rotating shifts caused the controllers to encounter a 
high level of stress. Thirty-eight percent of the respondents 
did not feel that the rotating shifts would cause the controllers 
to encounter high level of stress, while 36 percent of the respon¬ 
dents did feel that rotating shifts would cause stress problems, 
and 26 percent was uncertain. Here, the results are close and 
therefore, one cannot pass a verdict if a rotating shift would 
cause a high level of stress problems or not. 
In Question 8, the respondents replied to an inquiry 
about the effect of an increase in the controllers' salary. 
Thirty-two percent of the respondents agreed that an increase 
would encourage better performance, while 54 percent of the 
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respondents felt that an increase would not encourage better 
performance. Fourteen percent of the respondents were uncertain. 
The results indicated that a majority of the respondents felt 
that an increase in salary would not encourage better perfor¬ 
mance . 
Questions 9 and 11 are concerned with the rehiring of 
the air traffic controllers. Question 9 asked the respondents 
whether the FAA should rehire the striking controllers in the 
metropolitan Atlanta area. Firty-three percent of the respon¬ 
dents felt that FAA should rehire the striking controllers, 
while 37 percent felt that the FAA should not rehire them, and 
10 percent were uncertain. Even though 50 percent of the respon¬ 
dents in Question 1 felt that President Reagan's position to fire 
the striking controllers was justifiable, a large percentage of 
the respondents felt that the FAA should rehire the striking air 
traffic controllers. This could be due to experience the con¬ 
trollers have acquired. In Question 11, the respondents were 
asked if they felt to rehire the striking controllers would cause 
a conflict between the non-striking air traffic controllers and 
the striking controllers, A majority of the respondents (60 
percent) felt that to rehire the controllers would cause a con¬ 
flict. Twenty-eight percent did not feel that rehiring them 
would cause conflict and 12 percent was uncertain. One can say 
that probably, this is one of the reasons why the striking con¬ 
trollers were not re-absorbed or re-employed by the FAA. 
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In question 12, the respondents were asked whether 
they felt other means of discipline should have been invoked 
in lieu of the termination of the controllers job. Even though 
50 percent of the respondents felt that Reagan's position to 
terminate the controllers was justifiable, 58 percent of the 
respondents felt that Reagan should have invoked other alterna¬ 
tives in lieu of dismissing the controllers. Only 38 percent 
of the respondents agreed with Reagan's position to terminate 
them, and 6 percent was uncertain. In questions 13 and 14, the 
respondents were asked whether they felt a suspension or a re¬ 
primand would have been a viable alternative in lieu of termi¬ 
nating the striking air traffic controllers. Fifty-four per¬ 
cent of the respondents felt that a suspension would have been 
a viable alternative, and 28 percent disagreed. Eighteen per¬ 
cent of the respondents were uncertain. Forty percent of the 
respondents felt that a reprimand would have been a viable 
alternative, and 47 percent of the respondents felt that a re¬ 
primand would not have been a viable alternative. Thirteen 
percent of the respondents were uncertain. The results of the 
respondents indicated that a reprimand may have been a light 
means of discipline, while the susoension would have been a 
viable alternative. 
In question 15# the respondents were asked whether they 
felt the airline industry was affected. A majority of the re¬ 
spondents (60 percent) indicated that the strike had an adverse 
effect on the airline industry. In question 16, the respondents 
were asked whether they felt the strike has forced the airlines 
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to increase the ticket fare to cover any financial losses. 
Thirty-one percent of the respondents indicated that the air¬ 
line industry was not forced to increase the ticket fare, while 
53 percent of the respondents believed that the airline in¬ 
dustry increased its ticket fare to cover financial losses 
which occurred as a result of the strike. Sixteen percent of 
the respondents were uncertain. 
The following questions involved the effect of the 
strike on air traffic in the Atlanta area. In question 18, 
the respondents were asked whether they felt the FAA would en¬ 
counter difficulties rebuilding the air traffic control 
system in metropolitan Atlanta. Fifty percent of the respon¬ 
dents felt that the FAA would encounter difficulties while 
35 percent disagreed. Even though $0 percent of the respondents 
felt hat Reagan'S position to terminate the air traffic control¬ 
lers was justifiable, about the same percentage indicated that 
the Federal Aviation Administration would encounter difficulties 
rebuilding the svstem. In question 19, the respondents were 
asked whether they felt that the present system in metropolitan 
Atlanta is safe. Fifty-eight percent of the respondents felt 
» 
that the air traffic control system was safe, and 23 percent 
felt that the system was not safe. The majority of the respon¬ 
dents indicated that the air traffic system in metropolitan 
Atlanta is safe. 
In question 21, the respondents were asked how often 
they use the Hartsfield International Airport, The airport 
was used freauently by 33 percent of the respondents. It was 
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used occasionally by 47 percent of the respondents, and rarely 
used by 20 percent. Furthermore, when the question was broken 
down according to sex, 42 percent of the mala respondents used 
the Kartsfield International Airport frequently. Thirty-six 
percent of the male respondents used the airport occasionally, 
and 22 percent of the respondents rarely used the airport. On 
the other hand, 25 percent of the female respondents indicated 
that they used the airport frequently, while 58 percent of 
them used the airport occasionally, and 1? percent of them 
rarely used the airport. The results indicated that the male 
respondents used the airport more frequently than the female 
respondents. This is probably true because men are more busi¬ 
ness-oriented than the opposite sex. 
Similar to question 21, question 22 asked the respon¬ 
dents to indicate how the air traffic controllers' strike 
affected their company or business. Fifty-seven percent of 
the male respondents indicated that their businesses were nega¬ 
tively affected, while 19 percent of them indicated that their 
businesses were not affected, and 24 percent of the respondents 
were uncertain. Sixty-one percent of the female respondents 
» 
indicated that their businesses were negatively affected, while 
31 percent of the females indicated that they were not nega¬ 
tively affected, and 8 percent were uncertain. While it seemed 
that the percentage was higher for females, actually it was 
higher for the males because their ratio was larger. This 
position is confirmed by an earlier discusion on page 9» The 
male respondents were probably more affected because the study 
36 
indicated that they traveled more frequently than women. 
In addition to the responses of each question, the study 
included a cross tabulation of questions 1 by 17. Question 17 
has been analyzed by frequency distribution. These questions 
are of such importance that the Chi Square was used to deter¬ 
mine the opinions of both sex. Tables 6 and 7 illustrate 
the breakdown by sex. Question 1 asked the respondents 
whether President Reagan's position to terminate the striking 
air traffic controllers was justifiable. In question 17 the 
respondents were asked whether the public was affected. 
Table 6 shows that 52 percent of the male respondents 
felt that the public was adversely affected, and agreed with 
Reagan's position to terminate the striking air traffic con¬ 
trollers. Thirty-four percent of the male respondents agreed 
that the public was affected, but disagreed with Reagan's 
position to terminate the controllers. Six percent agreed with 
Reagan's position to terminate the controllers, but did not 
feel that the public was affected. On the other hand, 4.0 per¬ 
cent of the male respondents agreed that the public was affect¬ 
ed, but disagreed with Reagan's position. The results indica- 
tedthat a majority of the male respondents felt that Reagan's 
position to terminate the controllers was justifiable and the 
public was affected. 
Table 7 indicates that 3^.6 percent of the female re¬ 
spondents agreed with Reagan's position, and that the public 
was adversely affected. While 38.5 percent of the female re¬ 
spondents disagreed with Reagan's position and agreed that the 
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public was affected. Only 5.8 percent agreed with Reagan's 
position and disagreed that the public was affected. Similarly, 
5.8 of the female respondents agreed with Reagan's position and 
did not feel that the public was affected. The results indicate 
that a majority of the female respondents disagreed with Reagan's 
position to terminate the striking controllers and agreed that 
the public was affected. 
38 
TABLE 6 
CROSSTABULATION OF QUESTION 17 BY 1 M ALE 
Question 1 (Variable 1) KC'.'- 
TOTAL 
DK A D 
I 2 I 2 6 I 17 I 45 
TV I 4.4 I 6 7.9 1 37. 8 I 90.0 
Question 17 I 1G0.0 r 89.7 I 80.5 I 
(Variable 2) I 4.0 i 5 2.C I 34.0 I 
-I* 
i 0 i 3 I 2 I 5 





 i 10.3 1 lo.S I 
I 0.G i 6.0 I 4.0 I 
-1- 
COLiJ1’;.' 2 2 9 19 6 0 
TCT & r, 4.0 53.0 
o
 • 
(X 1 0 n . f 
Question Is Do-you feel that President Reaaan's position 
on the air traffic controllers' strike was 
justifiable? 
Question 17* Do you feel the public was affected? 
A - AGREE 
D - DISAGREE 
DK- DON'T KNOW 
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TABLE 7 
CROSSTABULATIGN OF QUESTION 17 BY 1 FEMALE 









.-93— A D 
I 2 i 1 I 5 I 8 
I 25.0 i 12.5 I 62.5 I 15.4 
I 1 00.0 i 4.5 1 17.9 I 
I 3.8 i 1.9 I 9.6 I 
I- 
I 0 i 18 I 20 I 38 
I 0.0 i 47.4 I 52.6 I 73.1 
I 0.0 i 81.8 I 71.4 I 
I 0.0 i 34.6 I 38.5 I 
I- 
I 0 i 3 I 3 I 6 
I 0.0 i 50.0 I 50.0 I 11.5 
I 0.0 i 13.6 I 10.7 I 
I 0.0 i 5.8 1 5.8 I 
I- 





 42.3 53.8 100.0 
Question 1: Do you feel that President Reagan's position 
on the air traffic controllers' strike was 
justifiable? 
Question 17: Do you feel the public was affected? 
A- AGREE 
D - DISAGREE 
DK- DON'T KNOW 
VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The review of secondary material, and the final analysis 
of the questionnaire reveal that the FAA, the airline industry, 
PATCO, and the public were adversely affected as a result of the 
air traffic controllers' strike. Although some of the demands 
made by PATCO were justified, the organization initiated an 
illegal strike. PATCO continued to refuse the counter proposals, 
which were within the legal bounds of government legislation. 
The inability to reach an agreement during the negotiation pro¬ 
cess led directly to a stalemate that not only prevented a timely 
settlement, but also endangered the safety and efficiency of 
service in the metropolitan Atlanta area, and in many parts of 
this country. The strike imposed serious limitations upon the 
air traffic system and the FAA's ability to control safely air 
traffic at the existing volume. 
The questionnaire reveals that the air traffic con¬ 
trollers' strike affected the FAA, the airline industry, the 
business community, the general public and the Professional Air 
Traffic Controllers Organization. The air traffic controllers 
strike had a tremendous impact on the operation of air traffic 
service because airlines were forced to reduce the number of 
flights to the users. The FAA also had to increase the working 
hours of its employees at the facilities so that they could 
provide the public with air travel service. 
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APPENDIX A 
SUMMARY OF PATCO AND BARGAINING POSITIONS 
APPENDIX A 
Summary of PATCO and Bargaining Positions 
PAY 
PATCO Demands 
$10,000 increase (A.39,S.l) 
107o increase at signing (A.39.S.4) 
Normal longevity increase (A.39,S.5) 
COLA (A.39.S.6) 
OJT instructor pay (A.39,S.10; 
A. 53,S.4) 








Option to accrue leave in lieu 
of overtime (S.40.S.1) 
Portal-to-portal overtime 
formula (A.40.S.6) 
Eliminate aggregate salary 
limit (A.39,S.11) 
Revise grade and pay 
retention (A.15,S.11 ; A.62,S.15) 







HOURS OF WORK 
4-day workweek (A.34.S.1) NO 
8-hour workday (A.34,S.l) YES 
position rotation (A.37.S.3) Retain current 
contract provision 
of no more than 2 
hours consecutively 








Improved retirement (A.93) NO 
Improved health benefits 
(A.90) NO 
Improved life insurance 
(A.91) NO 
Increased annual leave 
(A.28) NO. In fact, the 
FAA proposes that 
bargaining unit 
employees be re¬ 
stricted to taking 
15 days leave per 
year. 
Increased sick leave 
(A.29) NO. Additionally, 
the Agency proposes 
that "The Employer 
at the national 
level may determine 
that the number of 
pattern of absences 
throughout a faci¬ 
lity or the air 
traffic system is 
such that medical 
certificates for 
absences of three 
(3) days or less 
are required." 
Increased holidays (A.32) NO 
Increased leave for special 
circumstances (A.31) NO 
Increased periods of excused 
absence (A.31,S.8,10,12) NO 
Maternity leave (A.30) LWOP not to exceed 







contracts (A.12) NO 
Changes to or implementation 
of personnel policies, prac¬ 
tices or matters affecting 




Articles 5, 12 and 
20 is adequate. 
FAA might consider 
a mid-term bar¬ 
gaining procedure. 
Negotiations required to 
change any benefit, privilege, 
practice, custom, policy or 
order (A.5.S.2) 
NO 
Staffing levels (A.75) NO 
Minimum staffing orders 
(A.33,S.5) 
NO 




Hiring criteria (A.44) NO 




scheme. FAA will 
assign OJT instruc 
tor duties. 
System Operation Investi¬ 
gation Program (A.71) PATCO can retain 
its current repre¬ 
sentation rights, 
although the FAA 
has gutted the 
investigatory 
process by elimi¬ 
nating the "Go 






Employee decides if repre¬ 
sentation is required^ 
(A.6.S.1) 
Right to remain silent 
or to refuse to give a 
written statement (A.6.S.2) 
Increase the amount of 
representational time to 
accommodate the expanded 
representational respon¬ 
sibilities mandated by 
Civil Service Reform Act 
of 1978. 
additional time for 
meetings with 
employer, (A.2.S.24) 
additional time for 
grievance preparation. 
(A. 7,S.17) 
additional time for 
briefing new employees# 
(A.2.S.16) 
additional time for 
performance of LMR 
duties. (A. 2 , S . 9) 
additional time for 
attendance at PATCO 









sentative can use 
20 hours (instead 
of present 16 
hours) of the time 
already granted 
under Article 2, 
Section 14 for 
attendance at the 
PATCO Rep. school. 
However, the total 
amount of represen¬ 
tational time would 




16 hours of contact 
orientation,(A.2,S.23) 
Principal facility repre¬ 
sentative or designee may 
be accompanied by other 
persons during meetings 
with the facility chief 
or designee, (A. 2 , S. 3) 
FAA 
8 additional hours 




The number of Union 
representatives may 
not exceed the 




PATCO office at facility. 
(A.9.S.8) 
Commercial telephone 
in each PATCO office, 
(A.9.S.8) 
PATCO bulletin boards, 
(A.9.S.2) 
NO. FAA offered 
space for placing 
a file cabinet or 
similar container. 
FAA retains right 
to cancel such an 
arrangement. 
The Union may 
install a phone 
in the space 
designated for 
locating the file 
cabinet or similar 
container. 
YES. If " (t)he 
parties agree that 




boards will not be 
used to post mate¬ 
rials which dis¬ 
credit or attack 
bargaining unit 
employees, the 
Union or the Em¬ 
ployer." (Nate: 
if adopted, little 
material other than 
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TRAINING 
PAT CO FAA 
Guaranteed qualification 
training for an applicant 
selected for a new position. 
(A.15,S.9) 
NO 
Provide at the FAA Academy at 
least once every three years a 
specific amount of technical 
training for each bargaining 
unit employee. (A.52,S.3) 
NO 
Provide a specific amount 
of formal classroom training 
to each air traffic controller 
every four weeks. (A.53.S.2) 
NO 
Provide developmental controllers 
a minimum number of hours of 
simulated radar training before 
subjecting them to live radar 
traffic environments. (A.52.S.8) 
NO 
Provide PATCO the opportunity 
to realistically participate in 
the formulation and implementation 
of all phases of initial, develop¬ 
mental, refresher, proficiency 
and remedial training programs. 
(A.52.S.4) 
"The Union may submit 
and make recommenda¬ 
tions for improvement 
to the national pro¬ 
gram. The Employer 
agrees to consider 
recommendations sub¬ 
mitted by the Union." 
OJT will be performed only by 
bargaining unit employees who 
have: 1) completed specific 
training; and 2) served a 
minimum of one year at the full 
performance level at their 
present facilities. (A.52,S.l) 
MEDICAL 
NO. Eliminate cur¬ 
rent volunteer 
scheme. FAA will 
assign OJT instruc¬ 
tor duties. 
Employee shall select 
certified AME to perform 




UNION FACILITIES (Cont.) 
PATCO FAA 
meeting announce¬ 
ments could be 
posted. The right 
of free speech 
would become a con¬ 
dition of the past.) 
EMPLOYEE RIGHTS 
All employees shall be treated 
in a fair, just and equal 
manner, free from discrimina¬ 
tion or harassment of any 
time£ (A. 11, S . 15) 
Such language is 
troublesome and 
should not be in 
next contract. 
SENIORITY 
Based on total time in 
PATCO bargaining unit 
positions. 
Method for filling 
vacancies within the 
PATCO Bargaining Unit, 
(A.15) 
Method for determining 
watch schedule assignments^ 
(A.33) 
Method for resolving 
annual leave requests. 
(A.28.S.5) 
NO 
Reduce current con¬ 
tract provision by 
limiting eligibility 
to those candidates 
who are employed at 
a grade no higher 
than one grade above 
the grade of the 
position to be filled. 
FAA will provide no 
assurance of either 
NSO's use or increase 
in the number of 
cross-option bids. 
NO 
Retain current lan¬ 
guage which provides 
for seniority to be 





Method for making OJT 
instructor assignments,, 
(A. 5 3, S . 2 ) 
Method for selecting 
employees for temporary 
assignments away from the 
facility, (A.17.S.2) 
Method for making 
temporary promotions. 
(A.23.S.1) 
Method for effecting 
staffing realignments 
in the event of staffing 
imbalances or facility 
reorganization. (A.24) 
DRESS CODE 
Employees shall groom and 
attire themselves in a 
neat, clean manner appro¬ 
priate to the conduct of 
air traffic control. 







which provides for 
seniority to be on 
total CAA/FAA service. 
FAA would decide 
areas or teams from 
which volunteers 
would be solicited. 
"Members of the bar¬ 
gaining unit in shall 
groom and attire them¬ 
selves in a neat, 
clean manner appro¬ 
priate to the conduct 
of government business. 
Neckties are not man¬ 
datory. Clothing such 
as overalls, denims, 
dungarees, jeans, san¬ 
dals, sneakers, tennis 
shoes, running shoes, 
sweat suits, tee 
shirts, collarless 
shirts, gym attire, 
shorts, hats, cloth¬ 
ing with printing, 
slogans, pictures, 










shall be required and adminis¬ 
tered under specified conditions 
which protect the employee from 
arbitrary decisions. (A.66,S.2) 
FAA prohibited from obtaining 
employee medical records 
developed in association with 
services not paid for by the 
FAA. (A.66.S.8) 
Bargaining unit employees shall 
not be required to submit to 
psychological testing (A.67) 
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES 
FAA will notify PATCO as soon 
as possible of technological 
and procedural changes which 
could affect the jobs of 
bargaining unit employees. 
The Parties would negotiate 
and agree to a method of 
eliminating any potential or 
actual adverse effect on the 
workforce. (A.56) 
EQUIPMENT AND PROCEDURES 
Employee and Union must be 
satisfied that ATC equipment 
is acceptable and adequate 
(A.80.S.1) 
Procedural and safety committees 
shall be established at the 




FAA shall retain right 
to require psycholo¬ 
gical testing of any 
employee. 
"In recognition of 
the Professional Air 
Traffic Controllers 
Organization as an 
aviation oriented 
organization the 
Parties at the national 
level shall from time 
to time exchange views 
on the technical and 
operational aspects of 
the air traffic pro¬ 
gram. " 
NO 
NO. FAA views the 
development of tech¬ 
nical procedures as 
a management preroga¬ 
tive which it has 




FAA acknowledgement of the 
stressful nature of the ATC 
work environment. 
Establish a rest and recupera¬ 
tion program for bargainint 
unit employees. (A.85.S.3) 
The Parties shall establish 
an employee assistance 
program to cover a range of 
social problems. (A.85.S.4) 
FAA to pay enrollment costs 
of employees in stress inter¬ 
vention programs. (A. 86) 
STAFFING 
Local minimum staffing orders. 
(A.33) 
National staffing standards 
(A. 7 5 X 
A minimum of 2 FPLs on duty 
at all times. (A.33,S.8) 
Developmentals and trainees 
receiving instruction during 
a shift are not to be counted 
in determining operational 
staffing for that shift. 
(A.53.S.6) 
AGENCY SHOP 




The job of air traffic 
controller is not 
uniquely stressful. 
NO 
The FAA would indepen¬ 
dently develop an 
alcohol and drug assis¬ 
tance program. Em¬ 
ployees bear the costs 
of treatment. Disci¬ 














FAA shall issue a detailed 
written explanation of the 
reasons for denying a grie¬ 
vance at each step. (A.7) 
Facility chief shall 
"set” forth the reasons 
for denial" when re¬ 
jecting an employee- 
filed grievance. 
Failure by the employer to 
render a decision at any step 
within the time limits provided 
in the contract shall render 
the grievance settled in favor 
of the grievant. (A.7) 
When management fails 
to render a timely 
response, the local 
Union shall be granted 
a waiver of the time 
limits for the next 
grievance which it fails 
to progress in a timely 
fashion. 
Priority scheduling of discip- AGREE 
linary grievances involving the 
loss or withdrawal of pay or 
benefits. (A.7.S.21) 
RETURN RIGHTS 
FAA to maintain a return rights Current contact 
program for both those employees 
who bid on and accept overseas 
assignment and those employees 
hired in Alaska, Hawaii, the 
possessions, territories and 
other overseas locations who bid 
on and accept a tour of duty within 
the contiguous 48 states. (A.62) 
IMMUNITY 
Implement an immunity program NO 
DURATION 












INITIAL FAA 1981 PROPOSALS 
TITLE 
Other Units Covered by 
the Agreement 
Leave of Absence and 
Rights of the Union 
Officials 
Union Publications and 
Information and Use of 
Employer's Facilities 
Employee Rights 
National Seniority Pro¬ 
cedures for Ingrade and 
Downgrade Reassignments 
Familiarization Flying 




INITIAL MANAGEMENT PROPOSALS 
Clarify to clearly limit 
article to accretions to the 
unit described in Sections 
1 and 2 of Article 2. 
Limit absences to those 
elected or selected to serve 
in continuing positions for 
periods not less than one 
year and provide for 30-day 
advance notice. 
Change Section 1 to limit 
postings to notices of 
meetings. 
Reduce broad disclaimer on 
off the job conduct and 
clarity "Union Representa¬ 
tive" to include only prin¬ 
cipal facility representa¬ 
tive and above. 
Redefine program coverage. 
Redefine limits of this 
program to prevent abuse 
by participants. 
Provide that volunteers be 
solicited from areas or 
teams deemed by management 
to be imbalanced. 
Remove Sections 2 and 3. 
Remove dual notice procedure. 
Change mandatory working of 
Section 10. Reinstitute 










Voluntary Change in 








INITIAL MANAGEMENT PROPOSALS 
Add Section 2 providing for 
management right to solicit 
volunteers. 
Eliminate Section 8. Change 
Section 5 to exclude 
facilities operating less 
than 24 hours. 
Change existing article to 
make it consistent with 
govemmentwide regulations 
on employee parking. Apply 
only to AT spaces. 
Change to emphasize that OJT 
will be performed as as¬ 
signed. 
Clarify to state the clear 
intent of the article 
originally agreed to. 
Remove Section 9. 69 
APPENDIX C 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
iJiK-sr. tonnai re 
Listed below are statements or quest ions regarding the air traffic 
controllers' strike of 1981. beside each of the statements or 
questions please indicate whethet you agree (A), disagree (l>), or 
do not know (UK). The questions may he answered by simply placing 
an "X" in the appropriate space. 
A D i)K 
1) Do you feel that President Reagan's position       
on the air traffic controllers' strike was 
justifiable? 
2) Do you feel that the air traffic controllers 
were making legitimate demands by demanding 
higher salaries and shorter work hours?     
3) Do you feel that the air traffic controllers 
in the metropolitan Atlanta area acted 
properly by participating in the strike? 
4)  Do you feel that the air traffic controllers 
should continue to work 40 hours a week? 
I) Do you feel that reducing the air 
traffic controllers' work hours from* 
40 to 32 a week will alleviate the level 
of stress? 
A) Do you feel that maintaining the present 
work schedule will cause the air traffic 
controllers to become mentally destroyed? 
7) Do you feel that rotating shifts causes 
the controllers to encounter a high 
level of stress? 
8) Do you fuel that an increase in the air 
traffic controllers' salary will 
encourage better performance? 
9) Do you feel that the Federal Aviation 
Administration should rehire the‘striking 
air traffic controllers of the metrope1itan 
Atlanta area ? 
10) Do you feel that the striking air traffic 
controllers should be compensated for the 
loss of income while on strike? 
55 
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A D 1 IK 
11) Do you feel that rehiring the striking air 
traffic controllers will cause conflict 
among those non-striking controllers who 
returned to duty?      
12) Do you feel that other means of discipline 
should have been invoked in lieu of the 
termination of air traffic controllers' 
j bs?     
13) Do you feel that a suspension would have 
been a viable alternative? 
14) Do you feel that a reprimand would have 
been a viable alternative? 
15) o you feel that the air!ine industry in 
metropolitan Atlanta was adversely affected 
by the strike? 
16) Do you feel that the' strike has forced the 
airlines to increase the ticket fare to 
cover any financial losses? 
17) Do you feel the public was affected? 
18) Do you feel that the Federal Aviation 
Administration will encounter difficulties 
rebuilding the air traffic system in 
metropolitan Atlanta?     
19) Do you feel the present air traffic control 
system of metropolitan Atlanta is safe?       
2D) Do you feel thatthe results of the air 
traffic controllers' strike will discourage 
other unions in the public sector from 
engaging in unlawful strikes?       
21) How often do you use the Hartsfield International Airport? 




22) If you answered frequently in number 21, please indicate how the 
air traffic controllers' strike affected your company or business. 
1) negatively   
2) positively   
Do not know 3) 
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